low and, in fact, require states to penalize polluters that exceed allowable pollutant discharge levels under the Act. 16 Specifically, under the NPDES, either the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the state (when it assumes administration of the NPDES program) issues permits to polluters, allowing the discharge of pollutants within strict permit conditions, and imposes penalties when permit holders violate the conditions of their permits. States prefer to penalize polluters using sanctions developed under the Act's state-operated programs, as opposed to those under the citizen suit provision, because the fines imposed in citizen suits are payable to the federal government rather than to the states. 1 7 The penalties states seek under the NPDES state-operated programs, although integral to the federal Act, arise, in at least one court's view, under state instead of federal law. 18 If this is the case, sovereign immunity deprives states of an effective weapon ordinarily available to enforce the Clean Water Act against federal agencies, because the sovereign immunity waiver is limited to penalties arising under federal law. Accordingly, this would restrict states' enforcement actions to citizen suits, thereby diminishing their incentive and their financial capacity to abate federal agencies' pollution, leaving no meaningful deterrent to federal agencies.
This Note considers whether civil penalties that states impose on federal agencies for violations of NPDES permits arise under federal law and thus are covered by the Clean Water Act's waiver of sovereign immunity -an issue the Supreme Court is scheduled to address during the 1991 term. 19 Part I outlines the history of the Clean Water Act, discussing Supreme Court decisions and statutory amendments that affect the sovereign immunity provision. Part II explains the mechanics of the NPDES state permit process and examines, through analysis of statutory provisions, the degree of control retained by the EPA over individual states operating approved NPDES programs. Part III canvasses judicial treatment of the sovereign immunity question: the Ninth Circuit has ruled that states cannot impose civil penalties on federal agencies because those penalties arise under state law, 20 while the Sixth Circuit has held that states can impose such penalties 16. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b) (1988 Cir. 1990) , cert. granted, lll s. Ct. 2256 Ct. (1991 .
20. California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988 ). [Vol. 90:183 because they arise under federal law. 21 Finally, Part IV argues that resolution of this question should turn primarily on the statutory language and framework of the Clean Water Act, as opposed to its convoluted legislative history. The Note concludes that, given the extent of federal oversight and the practical implications of the unusual hybrid arrangement, state-imposed civil penalties arise under federal law. Federal agencies, therefore, should be subject to state-imposed penalties for violations of NPDES permits.
I. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER Ac:r
By the late 1970s, Congress had passed a series of stringent federal environmental standards in an attempt to arrest the massive environmental damage perpetrated in previous decades. The laws' aims were ambitious. The Clean Air Act, for example, sought to protect air quality and "initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution,"22 while the Clean Water Act enunciated a national goal "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated . . . . " 23 Each of the major statutes -the Clean Air Act, 2 4 the Clean Water Act, 25 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 26 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 27 -contains a provision waiving sovereign immunity to some extent. 28 The question remains: To what extent? Whether wittingly or otherwise, Congress has created a network of environmental statutes whose lack of uniformity defies comparative analysis and whose equivocality confounds those seeking evidence of a clear waiver. 21 . Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990 s. Ct. 2256 Ct. (1991 .
22. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b) (West Supp. 1991) ).
23. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 , 1575 (1977 26. 42 u.s.c. § § 6901-6992k (1988) .
27. 42 U.S.C. A. § § 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991 .
28. The breadth of these waivers varies. For example, the Clean Air Act's waiver is the broadest, subjeeting federal facilities and personnel to all state and local air pollution requirements, substantive and procedural, and to the same criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that private polluters face. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991 . The Clean Air Act provides for "as broad a waiver of sovereign immunity as is found in any of the environmental statutes." Michael Donnelly & James G. Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid -the DOD and Environmental Law, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 37, 38 (1986) . RCRA, on the other hand, contains the most narrow waiver language, requiring federal facilities to comply only with "require- 36 Likewise, in State Water Resources Control Board, the Court reasoned that although the Clean Water Act obliged federal water polluters to comply with state "requirements respecting control and abatement of pollution," securing a permit from a state with an EPAapproved program was not one of those requirements. 37 In that case, the states of California and Washington challenged the EPA administrator's position that states lacked authority to require federal facilities to obtain permits. The Court ruled in favor of the EPA, narrowly interpreting the word "requirement" to exclude state NPDES permit 29. 426 U.S. 167 (1976 Congress promptly repudiated the Supreme Court's narrow construction by amending the language in both the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act to expand the extent to which the Acts' provisions included federal polluters. 41 The revised Clean Water Act, instead of merely subjecting federal agencies to "requirements," exacted a broader federal obligation. The 1977 version, which. remains in force today, reads:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government ... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity . . The amendment furnishes strong evidence of congressional intent to treat the federal government essentially like private polluters. According to the Senate report on the amendments, Congress amended the Act to "indicate unequivocally" that federal facilities were "subject to all of the provisions of state and local pollution laws." 43 The NPDES program is a complex statutory system through which pollutant dischargers obtain permits allowing them to release some pollutants under strict permit conditions. Because it is the violation of these permit conditions that leads to the sanctions that are the subject of this Note, an understanding of the NPDES scheme is crucial. Part II discusses in detail the NPDES permit program. Section II.A focuses on the origins and basic procedures of the NPDES. Section II.B analyzes the distribution of permit authority and the degree of control the EPA retains over state permit programs.
A. Dynamics of the NPDES Permit Program
In its formative stage, pollution control legislation proceeded from the assumption that the promulgation and enforcement of measurable quality standards would achieve satisfactory pollution abatement. The current Clean Water Act's precursor -which Congress expressly devised "to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution" 45 -evinced this theory. This legislative approach to reduce pollution, however, merely demonstrated the ineffectiveness of water quality standards. 46 Thus, Congress shifted its objective away from the tolerance of acceptable pollution levels to the complete elimination of pollutant discharge into navigable waters. 47 In pursuit of this objective, Congress designed the Clean Water Act to eliminate all pollution of navigable waters by making the act of polluting the nation's waterways, rather than the results of the discharge, the actionable offense. 48 The cornerstone of this ambitious program is contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which boldly states that "the discharge of any pollutants ... shall be unlawful. " 49 After proclaiming this sweeping ban on pollutant discharge, Congress carved out an exception for instances where compliance with the otherwise impervious ban was not "technologically and economically achievable."50 Specifically, Congress incorporated a provision outlining the NPDES. 51 Under the NPDES regime, facilities exceptionally burdened by the complete proscription of pollutant discharges may obtain permits allowing them to release specified levels of pollutants. Those exempted still must employ the best practical control technology available in meeting permit requirements. 52 To obtain a permit, such facilities also must meet requirements of the Act that mandate monitoring equipment, allow inspections, and, most significantly, impose effi.uent limitations53 on the amounts of pollutants discharged as specified in section 1342(a)(l). That section provides that "the [EPA] Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearingL] issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) ... upon condition that such discharge will meet ... all applicable requirements" set forth throughout the Clean Water Act. 54 An NPDES permit thus explicitly incorporates a discharger's 49. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988) . The current Act prohibits the "discharge of pollutants," while the former language focused on "pollution." The discharge of pollutants is "the addition of materials in any quantity to the nation's waters," while pollution is "a demonstrable effect on § 1342 (1988) . In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) , the Supreme Court explained that "{efi•ery point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by 11 permit, which directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals." 451 U.S. at 318 (footnote omitted); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 , 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977 ) (stating that legislative history clearly shows Congress intended the NPDES permit to be the only means by which a discharger of pollutants may escape the total prohibition of discharges stated in § 1311(a)).
52. See Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Envt. v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902, 908 (W.D. Penn. 1980 ), affd., 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981 ) (holders of NPDES permit bound to employ best practical control technology currently available in meeting requirements of permit, and whether they complied with terms of their application or project specifications did not excuse them from fulfilling conditions of permit).
53. An effiuent limitation is "any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of a contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (11) Absent state participation, s 6 dischargers obtain NPDES permits directly from the federal EPA. The EPA may undertake enforcement action -including levying administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions -against permit holders who fail to comply with permit conditions. s 7 Private citizens also can pursue civil actions "against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an effiuent standard or limitation . . . or . . . an order issued . . . with respect to such a standard or limitation."ss In cases where citizens prevail, courts may order injunctive relief or "apply any appropriate civil penalties."s 9 Since these citizens act as private attorneys general, rather than conventional plaintiffs, such civil penalties are payable to the U.S. Treasury. 60 The maximum effiuent limitations of the NPDES target "point sources" -which the Clean Water Act defines as "any discernible confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 61 The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to adopt elaborate regulations that govern the issuance of permits. 62 Further, detailed guidelines direct the course of the BP A's promulga- 
Section 1342(k) of the Clean Water Act provides:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1988 [ Vol. 90:183 tion of such regulations. 63 In sum, the Clean Water Act established a complex apparatus to enforce rigid maximum efiluent limitations on point sources where an immediate ban on pollutant discharge is impossible. The NPDES permit process converted these efiluent limitations and related standards into obligations enforceable against pollutant dischargers through both administrative and judicial action.
B. The Apportionment of Permit Authority
Administration of the NPDES permit process has never been delegated exclusively to the federal BP A. In its declaration of purpose for the Clean Water Act, Congress stated its policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... " 64 Accordingly, Congress incorporated several provisions in section 1342 empowering the BP A administrator to authorize states to operate their own individualized permit programs. 65 A state wishing to assume administration of the NPDES program within its borders must "submit to [the EPA] a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish" and verify that state laws authorize the proposed program. 66 State control of the permit process is contingent upon BP A approval, but once such approval is secured, the BP A will suspend its issuance of permits and instead allow the state to oversee the operation of the permit program. 67 Although states certainly possess some autonomy in their operation of NPDES permit programs, the BP A retains control over the program in several important respects. First, a state's freedom to design a permit process that suits its needs is constricted from the outset: the BP A must approve the state's proposed program before the state can implement it. Moreover, the prospect of BP A disapproval extends beyond the initial transfer of the federal program to state operation. An EPA-approved state permit program must "at all times be in accordance" with Clean Water Act provisions, 68 and the BP A retains the power to withdraw approval of a state permit program upon a determination that the program fails to comply with the requirements of section 1342.69 63. For example, these regulations originally were intended to "identify ••• the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best practicable control technology currently available," 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1XA) (1988) , and "specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control measures,'' such as cost-benefit analyses, age of equipment and facilities, and nonwater quality environmental impact. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1988 Besides retaining the power to review the operation of a state permit program and thereafter to potentially revoke state authority to issue permits, 70 the EPA also may veto a state's issuance of any individual permit. 71 Under section 1342, each state must provide the EPA with a copy of each permit application it receives and notify the EPA of any action it intends to take on the application. 72 No permit will be issued "if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of [the Clean Water Act]." 73 When the state's issuance of a given permit is arrested in this way, the EPA can issue the permit instead, imposing federally approved limits upon the discharger. 74 Clearly, then, while states do operate approved NPDES programs largely independently, the level of federal oversight and potential interference is considerable, 75 supporting the characterization of penalties for violation of NPDES permits as "arising under federal law."
III. THE CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER Acr
Interpreting the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver in the context of the NPDES scheme is the next step in ascertaining whether states may impose civil penalties on federal violators of NPDES permits. Current assessments of the waiver must address two separate issues. First, the law is now fairly well settled that the waiver includes civil penalties generally, as long as they arise under federal law. Section III.A.1 evaluates courts' reasoning in reaching that conclusion. Section III.A.2 then compares the Clean Water Act's waiver and RCRA's narrower waiver to clarify the breadth of the Clean Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that a State is not administering a program approved under this section in accordance with requirements of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such program. The Administrator shall not withdraw approval of any such program unless he shall first have notified the State, and made public, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1988 
A. Delimiting the Clean Water Act's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Although the early English conception of sovereign immunity was based on the belief that "the king could do no wrong," 76 the modem justification holds that the government must be protected in its day-today functions from judicial interference. 77 The federal government is free to waive its immunity, and cannot be sued unless it does so. 78 Such a waiver must be "express" 79 and "unequivocal."80 Nevertheless, in their endeavor to determine whether a statute contains a waiver, courts should not adopt a "crabbed construction" 81 or require Congress to use a "ritualistic formula" to accomplish such a waiver.82 Thus, with regard to state-imposed civil penalties against federal agencies in violation of NPDES permits, the primary means for courts to determine whether Congress waived sovereign immunity is "by refer- Supp. at 605. The MESS court's narrow interpretation of the Clean Water Act's waiver has been universally rejected, and the decision itself is considered an aberration. Both the majority and the dissent in Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 Ct. (1991 , agreed that Congress waived sovereign immunity for civil penalties in the Clean Water Act. 904 F.2d at 1060; 904 F.2d at 1067 (Guy, J., dissenting). The dissenter, Judge Guy, also rejected the MESS court's contention that the waiver of immunity for civil penalties is an inadequate "vehicle to end the pollution which this country is facing," MESS. 655 F. Supp. at 604; to that, Judge Guy rejoined, "[c]ourts need not debate Congress's sagacity •.
• when its [Vol. 90:183 In Sie"a Club v. Lujan, 90 for example, an environmental group sought civil penalties against the U.S. Department of Interior for failing to comply with the requirements of an EPA-issued NPDES permit. 91 The federal government moved to dismiss, characterizing the Clean Water Act's waiver of sovereign immunity as insufficiently broad to permit suits seeking civil penalties against the United States. 92 The district court denied the motion to dismiss and instead granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that "civil penalties clearly are 'sanctions' within the meaning of the [Clean Water Act]."93
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, soundly rejecting the sole district court case 94 upon which the government relied 95 and holding that section 1323(a) "expressly authorizes the courts to assess civil penalties against federal agencies for violations of the [Clean Water Act] ." 96 While the court acknowledged some disagreement over whether the waiver's use of the term "requirements" includes civil penalties, 97 it agreed with the district court that the statute's waiver of sovereign immunity as to "sanctions" clearly includes civil penalties. 98 The court said its holding was supported by the plain language of the statute; 99 for example, section 1323's limitation of sovereign immunity to "civil penalties arising under federal law" implies that sovereign immunity for civil penalties already had been waived. 100 The arguments put forth in Sie"a Club typify those that courts have employed to counter federal government assertions that civil penalties are neither "requirements" nor "sanctions" under the Clean Water Act.101 intent is so apparent from the face of the statute." DOE, 904 F.2d at 1067 n.3 (Guy, J., dissenting 
Contrasting Judicial Characterizations of Civil Penalties
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to reach the question of whether civil penalties imposed by states on federal agencies for violations of NPDES permits arise under federal or state law. Ct. 2256 Ct. (1991 .
In California v. United States Department of Navy, 114 California sought civil penalties against the Navy for violating its NPDES permit when it discharged improperly treated waste into the San Francisco Bay. California argued that the NPDES provision of the Clean Water Act mandates adequate state authority to abate permit violations and, to this end, specifically requires states to include provisions for civil and criminal penalties in their legislative schemes. Consequently, provisions approved by the EPA administrator necessarily fall within section 1323, which subjects federal dischargers to civil penalties "arising under" federal law.m
In a sketchy opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected California's argument. First, citing two statutory references to "state" operation, the court stated that the structure of the Clean Water Act does not support the conclusion that the civil penalties at issue arise under federal law. 116 Section 1342, for example, requires states to submit to the EPA a description of the program they intend to administer under state law. 117 Moreover, the court said, the California water pollution statute that sets out some of the NPDES enforcement provisions authorizes the state attorney general to seek civil penalties in state superior court. 118 The Ninth Circuit also found no explicit congressional intent to waive sovereign immunity in this situation, reasoning that "California's position would essentially nullify [section 1323(a)]'s express limitation of civil penalties against federal agencies to those arising under federal law." 119 That is, the court assumed that if the waiver's limitation did not apply to civil penalties imposed by states against federal agencies under state-operated permit programs, then the limitation applied to no penalties at all. 120 "Congress clearly did not intend such a result," the court concluded.121
Finally, the court relied on a phrase from the Clean Water Act's legislative history indicating that state-operated permit programs "are 'not a delegation of Federal authority,'" but that they" 'function[] in lieu of the Federal program.' " 122 The court failed to elaborate upon the meaning of these phrases in the context of the sovereign immunity question. As this Note concludes, however, the legislative history ar- Vol. 90:183 gument the Ninth Circuit put forth is unconvincing for several reasons, including the fact that the quoted language comes from the legislative history for an entirely different section than that setting out the NPDES. 123 In 1990, the sovereign immunity issue came before the Sixth Circuit. In Ohio v. United States Department of Energy (DOE}, 124 the State of Ohio alleged that the Department of Energy's Fernald, Ohio, uranium processing plant "improperly disposed of hazardous wastes, released radioactive materials into the environment, and polluted surface and ground water." 125 A divided Sixth Circuit panel implicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis and found that the civil penalties Ohio sought to impose upon the federal agency "arose under federal law" for purposes of the sovereign immunity waiver. 126 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in DOE looked to statutory language and congressional intent, but found each supported the inclusion of state-imposed civil penalties against federal agencies. 127 Specifically, the court observed that the legislative scheme that creates the NPDES system logically assumes that state civil penalties arise under federal law:
The Clean Water Act mandates that the states may create their own water pollution laws, which may qualify to replace the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Upon implementing a state permit program "in accordance with" [section] 1342, the state assumes responsibility for pollution permits on behalf of and instead of the [EPA] . The [EPA] is charged with promulgating the standards that state programs must meet to obtain approval. In order to be approved, a state law must provide for civil penalties. Once a state water pollution law is approved, compliance with the State law is compliance with the Clean Water Act.12s
Oddly, both courts used essentially similar sources to support opposite results. Where the Department of Navy court stressed that state permit programs function "in lieu of" the federal program 129 to indicate a lack of federal authority, the DOE majority argued that the states operate the program "on behalf of and instead of" the EPA 130 to indicate that state-imposed sanctions arise under federal law. Moreover, while the Ninth Circuit cited statutory references to "state" operation and "state" law to prove state-run NPDES permit programs operate within state law, the Sixth Circuit found copious examples of statutory language placing the state permit programs "under" federal 123. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
124. 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 Ct. (1991 law. 131 For the most part, such semantic arguments on both sides are unconvincing. A more compelling argument the Ninth Circuit makes with regard to the statute's language, though developed in a mere sentence, is that the restriction of the waiver to civil penalties arising under federal law would have no meaning if it did not apply to the penalties states seek to impose on federal agencies. 132 The DOE court ignored this reading and concluded, almost as matter-of-factly, that the waiver's limitation "to civil penalties arising under federal law is aimed at state water pollution laws that fail to meet approval under the Clean Water Act."133
Determining which of these two perspectives is correct requires undertaking the difficult task of discerning what Congress was collectively thinking in enacting the Clean Water Act. Under the Sixth Circuit's view, Congress meant to clarify that the Clean Water Act's waiver does not extend to state water pollution laws, except, of course, those devised by states as part of the Act's NPDES system. Under the Ninth Circuit's view, on the other hand, Congress' exclusive purpose in including the limitation was to maintain federal immunity with regard to EPA-approved civil penalty provisions under state-operated NPDES programs, even though such immunity is undoubtedly waived when the BP A, not the state, issues the permit. The proposal in Part IV of this Note compares these views in more detail and argues against the Ninth Circuit's reading, finding an alternative reading to be both logically sound and supported by case law.
The narrow question of whether the civil penalties at issue arise under federal or state law also has been discussed in one lower court opinion. Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Department of Navy, 134 a case in the Northern District of Illinois, involved an allegation that the Navy failed to comply with the terms of a sewage discharge permit. The court initially refused to dismiss the suit because the plaintiff -a state agency -might possibly demonstrate at trial that the penalties it seeks in fact arise under federal law . 135 The court defined broacily what it means for a penalty to "arise under" federal law: the state agency, the court said, may be able to show that it is pursuing "federally-sanctioned penalties." 136 The phrase appears to 131. In Department of Navy, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that § 1342 "itself requires a state to submit to the [EPA] a description of the program it intends to administer under state law." 845 F.2d at 225. Contrarily, the DOE court pointed to a statement in the introductory section of the Clean Water Act that " [i] REv. 195, 214 (1983) . Though the debate is far more complex than represented here, the textualist argument is one that favors giving no weight to the Clean Water Act's legislative history on which the Ninth Circuit relied.
provide some support for each argument. This support consists primarily of general statements -most unrelated to the precise language at issue -from which courts can extrapolate a more specific congressional intent. The Department of Navy court and the DOE dissent both cited conference report language from the 1977 Clean Water Act amendments asserting that a state permit program "functions in lieu of the Federal program" and "is not a delegation of Federal authority." 139 This language, while providing some insight, is not dispositive for several reasons. First, as subsequent legislative history commenting retrospectively on the original legislation of several years earlier, it is of minimal legal significance. 140 Further, the comment does not appear under the history for section 1342, where the NPDES program is outlined, but under a later section setting out the Act's system for issuing permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material. 1 41 Earlier commentary under the NPDES section says nothing of federal authority.142 Finally, even if deemed to be an accurate view of Congress' intent regarding section 1342, the statements are general, made without a clear context, and do not unequivocally preclude the more specific finding that sovereign immunity is waived for state-imposed civil penalties against federal dischargers. 1 43
Commentary elsewhere that supports the broader waiver interpretation further undermines the view that legislative history proves Congress intended immunity to bar such suits against federal facilities. In the Senate Report for the original act in 1972, for example, the comments on section 1323, the federal facilities provision, acknowledge the "flagrant violations" by federal dischargers and the "[l]ack of Federal leadership" in controlling pollution, concluding that "[t]his section requires that Federal facilities meet all control requirements as if they were private citizens." 144 Taken on its face, this statement supports a broad waiver that would seemingly encompass state-imposed civil penalties. For the most part, however, legislative history does not lend [Vol. 90:183 itself to such clear readings and the Clean Water Act is one of many examples where the intent of Congress is better found elsewhere.
IV. SANCTIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF FEDERALLY

APPROVED PROGRAMS
If the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver is broad enough to include civil penalties imposed upon federal agencies for violation of NPDES permits, the evidence of that must come from an examination of the statute and the enforcement scheme it creates. Because legislative history is of limited utility, 145 the "most natural reading" of the statute should dictate whether the United States waived sovereign immunity. 146 This requires close scrutiny of the statute in the context of the NPDES scheme.
Under the NPDES program, pollutant dischargers do not directly violate either federal or state law; they violate the conditions of their NPDES permit. 147 That permit, for the purposes of this Note, is issued by the state under a program approved by the federal govemment.148 A state legislature passes the sanctions at issue to determine how to penalize those who violate the permit. Those penalties, then, are a matter of state law, but required by federal law, because the Clean Water Act mandates the penalty provision. 149 Unlike many laws, which take away rights and privileges, the Clean Water Act NPDES scheme grants rights to dischargers. The Act completely prohibits pollutant discharge; 150 its hybrid NPDES system, however, authorizes the issuance of permits to dischargers that allow them to pollute up to the permits' specified limitations. Clearly, if these dischargers did not have a permit and they polluted nonetheless, they would be in violation of federal law. Similarly, polluters who do have permits but discharge more than the authorized amount also are outside the scope of the permit. In this sense, both the penalties for those polluting without a permit and the sanctions for dischargers exceeding the conditions of their permits arise conceptually under federal law.
A second statutory analysis also explains why the civil penalties at issue are encompassed within the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver. While the congressional purpose behind limiting the waiver to penalties arising under federal law is obscure, the purpose behind the federal facilities provision overall is manifest from the language itself. Congress responded in strong terms to the deplorable 151 Congress was aware that it could not begin to ameliorate the nation's environmental predicament without implementing strong measures to hold the federal government accountable for its share of the problem. Thus, Congress spoke in absolute terms, applying the waiver to "any requirement ... substantive or procedural," to the exercise of "any Federal, State, or local ... authority," and to "any process and sanction . . . enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner." 152 If sovereign immunity limited states' enforcement options against these agencies, that effort would be severely diminished and the congressional purpose largely undermined.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's argument -that the waiver's limitation to penalties arising under federal law is meaningless if not meant solely to confine the waiver to federally imposed, not state-imposed, penalties -is unconvincing. Courts have suggested the waiver's limitation targets state pollution laws not approved under the Clean Water Act 153 or not "federally-sanctioned." 154 These related interpretations are consistent with the broad scope of Congress' waiver in the federal facilities provision as well as Congress' aim to completely eliminate pollutant discharge. Moreover, they give effect to a congressional interest in confining the scope of the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver to state penalties specifically mandated by the Act, as opposed to any pollution laws state legislatures might enact without federal approval.
CONCLUSION
Statutory interpretation is an imprecise undertaking. That is especially true in a case such as this, where the Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, like so many products of congressional compromise, fails to explain explicitly the rationale behind the requirement that civil penalties covered by the sovereign immunity waiver arise under federal law. Traditional rules of statutory construction, though often in conflict with each other and inherently manipulable, may provide some help. According to the Ninth Circuit, one of those interpretive rules, which counsels against a construction that would render certain words or phrases meaningless, 1 55 weighs in favor of a finding that the civil penalties imposed by states upon federal agencies arise under state law. Unless one accepts the explanation that the limitation is aimed at state water pollution laws that the EPA has not ap· proved, 156 then, it is unclear what penalties would not arise under fed· eral law. The inclusion of the term in the provision would therefore be superfluous.
Yet another interpretive practice carries even greater weight. That approach looks at a statute's words within the context and structure of the Act, paying special attention to its object and purpose. Under this approach, a statute should be given no construction that would render meaningless the goals of the legislation as manifested in the statute as a whole. 157 The Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, with its emphasis on treating federal agencies exactly like private polluters, would be debilitated if states could not impose civil penalties upon federal and private violators alike. Moreover, unless the Clean Water Act can hold the country's worst polluter, the federal government, to its own environmental standards by subjecting federal agencies to state-imposed civil penalties, the Act's more general goal to "eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters" 158 becomes an impossibility. The statute's language, its structural framework, and the substantial federal control maintained over states under the NPDES scheme all support this Note's conclusion that such penalties do arise under federal law and thus are within the sovereign immunity waiver. 155. See California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988 L. RBv. 395 (1950) .
